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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In this WARN Act case, the principal issue is the 
amount of damages payable to employees who were on seasonal 
layoff at the time the employer announced what amounted to a 
permanent layoff.  The workers received letters sent less than 
the 60 days required by the statute before the permanent layoff 
began.  The district court awarded damages for 60 days, as if no 
notice had been sent.  We conclude that the notice was untimely, 
and that the violation period began on either the day each 
employee reasonably expected to return to work after the seasonal 
break or the permanent layoff date set by the employer, whichever 
was earlier.  Accordingly, we will remand for a recalculation of 
damages. 
 Plaintiffs are former employees of Preferred Meal 
Systems, Inc., which prepared pre-packaged meals for schools at a 
plant in Moosic, Pennsylvania.  Because of the seasonal nature of 
its business, the company had a practice of laying off employees 
during schools' summer vacation months.  In May and June 1992, 
eighty-five of Preferred's approximately 124 employees began 
their summer layoffs.   
 On June 26, 1992, the company sent a letter to the 
employees advising them that "[o]n August 1, 1992," it would be 
"ceasing direct food service employment" at the Moosic plant, and 
"laying off its food service employees."  "This letter is your 
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notice of layoff as of August 1, 1992."  Noting that this was 
"the normal time" when "seasonal lay-offs would occur," the 
letter explained that in the future, Preferred would "contract 
with Culi-Services, Inc. to provide food service employees at 
this location."  The letter continued, "Culi-Services, Inc. has 
an immediate offer of employment to make to you.  If you are 
interested . . . you must contact them directly."   
 On the same day, Culi sent a communication to the 
Preferred employees informing them that it would be "recruiting" 
for certain positions.  Culi also placed ads in the local 
newspapers seeking applicants for the jobs.  Culi's announced 
wages were lower than those Preferred had paid for the same work. 
 In a letter dated July 10, 1992, Preferred wrote again 
to its employees, stating:   
"The June 26 letter may have incorrectly 
conveyed the impression that Culi-Services, 
the new employer, has an offer of employment 
to make to you.  We are sorry for any 
confusion this letter may have created, but 
Culi-Services does not have an offer of 
employment for you at this time.  Any offer 
of employment will depend upon your 
application and Culi Services discretionary 
judgement as to the best applicants available 
for the limited number of positions 
available."   
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Preferred ultimately retained a small number of its employees and 
Culi hired some, but not all, of the remainder.   
 Plaintiffs, consisting of a class of sixty-nine former 
Preferred employees, filed a complaint against the company, 
asserting a failure to give them 60 days notice of the mass 
layoff as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109.  Preferred 
defended on the basis that it was a "joint employer" with Culi. 
Preferred also contended that the time between the seasonal 
layoff in May and the sub-contracting with Culi in late June 1992 
should not be considered as a WARN Act violation period.   
 Finding that the size of the work force at Moosic and 
the number of employees affected brought the matter within the 
scope of the WARN Act, the district court granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs and awarded damages in the amount of 
$253,337.43.  The court rejected Preferred's joint employer 
defense, observing that the WARN Act did "not define the term 
`employer' to encompass separate business entities which enjoy a 
simple contractual relationship to produce the goods previously 
produced by one of the entities."  The court also held that the 
plaintiffs' expectations of returning to employment with 
Preferred were destroyed on June 26, 1992, when the temporary 
layoff became permanent.  Accordingly, because they had not 
received a notice 60 days before that date, the plaintiffs were 
entitled to 60 days wages. 
 Preferred has appealed, reiterating its joint employer 
contention and also asserting that the damages should be 
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recalculated because the plaintiffs would have been unemployed in 
any event during the summer season.   
I. 
 Preferred's joint employer defense is based on the 
proposition that if the number of employees who took positions 
with Culi is taken into account, the threshold number of 
employees required to bring the WARN Act into play, 29 U.S.C.  
§ 2101(a)(2), is not met.  As Preferred sees it, if it and Culi 
are considered as a single enterprise, when eighty-five employees 
were laid off and fifty-four were re-employed by Culi, less than 
the statutory minimum of fifty employees were adversely affected. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6).     
 Preferred's only evidence that a joint employment 
relationship existed is that a union, attempting to secure an 
election at the Moosic plant, contended in a July 1993 letter to 
the National Labor Relations Board that Preferred was a joint 
employer with Culi.  Apparently, that case has not been resolved 
and its res judicata effect, if any, is not before us.   Nor 
need we consider whether there is a distinction between the 
policies established by the National Labor Relations Act, with 
respect to various employer alignments, and situations arising 
under the WARN Act.  See United Steelworkers of America v. Crown 
Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 59 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd 115 S. Ct. 
1927 (1995) (noting "vast" policy differences).  The union's bare 
contention is simply not an adequate basis for a finding on the 
issue in the case before us.   
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 Similarly, because of the lack of any factual 
development, we need not explore the analogies that Preferred 
relies upon in its citation of Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 
24 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1994) and International Alliance of 
Theatrical and Stage Employees v. Compact Video Services, Inc., 
50 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1995).  Those cases discussed the sales of 
businesses and the continuation of employment.    
 In the summary judgment context here, Preferred had the 
burden of producing evidence to support its claim of joint 
employment.  It did not do so, and consequently, the district 
court did not err in rejecting that defense. 
II. 
 The second issue raised by Preferred is the damages 
assessment.   Although not sharply delineated by the parties, we 
see the point in dispute to be the district court's determination 
that the employment relationship ended on June 26, 1992, when the 
first letter was sent, and that 60 days pay was due beginning on 
that day.  Preferred contends that the layoffs beginning in May 
and early June were customary and anticipated by the affected 
workers.  Consequently, the argument goes, when they left for the 
summer, the employees had no expectation of working until the 
autumn, and calculation of WARN damages should take into account 
the customary recall date in late August or early September.   
 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) provides: 
"An employer shall not order a plant closing 
or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day 
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period after the employer serves written 
notice of such an order --  
. . . to each affected employee . . . and to 
the State dislocated worker unit . . . and 
[to] the chief elected official of the unit 
of local government within which such closing 
or layoff is to occur."  
 An employer failing to notify the governmental units is 
subject to a civil penalty.  29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3).  Preferred 
did not file a report with the appropriate governmental units, 
but no claims for the civil penalties are presented here. 
Moreover, they are severable from those asserted by the 
employees.  We will therefore not consider the civil penalties 
further.  
 Section 2104(a)(1) provides that an employer who orders 
a "mass layoff" in violation of the notice provision is "liable 
to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss" as the 
result of such layoff for "back pay for each day of violation" 
and for employee benefits as well.  In United Steelworkers of 
America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
concluded that "WARN uses the term `back pay' simply as a label 
to describe the daily rate of damages payable."  Hence, that case 
establishes the upper limit of damages applicable here as 60 
calendar days wages.  Contra Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 
771-72 (10th Cir. 1995) (damages calculated on number of working 
days lost during the violation period); Carpenters Dist. Council 
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1286 (5th Cir. 1994) 
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(same).  Because the termination date of employment was not 
pertinent in North Star Steel, we did not address the point and 
that case does not control the resolution of the issue here.   
 The statute defines "mass layoff" as a reduction in 
force which "results in an employment loss."  29 U.S.C. 
§2101(a)(3)(B).  "Affected employees" are those "who may 
reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a 
consequence of a proposed . . . mass layoff."  29 U.S.C. 
§2101(a)(5).  Thus, an employer is liable when it fails to give 
notice of a mass layoff that may be expected to cause a work loss 
to employees.   
 Also pertinent to this case is 29 U.S.C. § 2102(c), 
which states:  "A layoff of more than 6 months which, at its 
outset, was announced to be a layoff of 6 months or less shall be 
treated as an employment loss . . . " unless the extension is 
caused by unforeseeable business circumstances and notice is 
given when it becomes reasonably foreseeable that the layoff will 
extend beyond six months.1 
                                                           
1The district court rejected Preferred's assertions that the 
layoff extension was not foreseeable.  We find no basis to 
disturb that ruling on this record.  29 U.S.C. § 2102(c) 
establishes a basis for finding liability on the part of 
Preferred, but it provides no guidance on the date the employment 
loss began or on the measure of damages as discussed in Parts A 
and C, infra. 
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A.  When Did Employees Suffer a "Work Loss?" 
 It appears that as of June 25, 1992 (the day before the 
first letter), the employees, who were then in the usual summer 
status, had no reasonable expectation of working for Preferred 
until the end of the seasonal layoff in the fall of 1992.  The 
summer shutdown in prior years did not cause compensable work 
losses under the WARN Act.  It was the conversion of the seasonal 
layoff into a permanent one that constituted the triggering 
event, which required Preferred to give notice. 
 The difference between the situation in 1992 and that 
of former years was that the workers would not be returning to 
their regular jobs at the usual time, but instead would be on 
indefinite layoff as of August 1, 1992.  At that point, further 
employment was no longer available, just as in the more common 
situation when persons steadily employed throughout the year are 
removed from a company's payroll on a specified date.   
 The letter of June 26, 1992 stated that the layoff was 
effective on August 1, 1992.  This is inconsistent with 
Preferred's argument, which instead would have us look to the 
date in September when the seasonal layoffs usually ended.  We 
believe that Preferred should be held to the terms in its letter. 
Moreover, Preferred treated the workers as "former employees" as 
of August 1, 1992 in connection with termination of benefits 
coverage, including health insurance. 
 The starting point of the violation period, therefore, 
should be August 1, 1992 (the day specified in the employer's 
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notice) unless based on Preferred's previous recall practice, an 
employee reasonably expected to be recalled before that date. 
B.  When Was Notice Given? 
 We must also consider whether the letters sent by 
Preferred qualified as notice under the WARN Act.  Pursuant to 
statutory direction, see 29 U.S.C. § 2107, the Secretary of Labor 
promulgated regulations governing the content of the notice.  The 
regulations do not specify the use of a special form, but they do 
require that certain information be included in understandable 
language.  The notice should tell the employees whether the 
planned action is to be permanent or temporary; the expected date 
when the layoff will begin; when the individual employees will be 
separated; when bumping rights exist; and the name and telephone 
number of a company official who may be contacted.  20 C.F.R.  
§ 639.7(d).   
 Flexibility in the notice requirement, however, is 
recognized by the provision that the notice is to be based on the 
best information available to the employer at the time the notice 
is served.  "It is not the intent of the regulations, that errors 
in the information provided in a notice that occur because events 
subsequently change or that [ ] minor, inadvertent errors are to 
be the basis for finding a violation of WARN."  20 C.F.R. 
§639.7(a)(4).  
 Fairly read, the regulations require a practical and 
realistic appraisal of the information given to affected 
employees.  We therefore examine the correspondence sent to the 
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employees to determine if it provided adequate notification of 
the mass layoffs.   
 The recipients of Preferred's letters could reasonably 
assume that they would suffer an employment loss.  The June 26, 
1992 letter, however, was ambiguous about the employees' future 
prospects with Culi.  Preferred recognized this problem and 
clarified the lack of guaranteed employment with Culi in its 
letter of July 10, 1992. 
 Giving a reasonably pragmatic interpretation of the two 
letters, we conclude that, read together, they do meet the 
statutory requirements of notice.  However, because the ambiguity 
in the first letter was not resolved until July 10, 1992, that 
later date should be the effective date of the notice.  
C.  Damages Calculation 
 In Dillard Dep't Stores, the Court of Appeals said 
"[t]he violation period is comprised only of those `days after 
the shutdown or layoff in violation of [the WARN Act] and extends 
for the number of days that notice was required but not given.'" 
15 F.3d at 1286 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1052 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2078, 2085). 
Further, the Court commented that if an employee was actually 
terminated within the 60 day notice period "such that the 
employee actually received less than the full sixty days notice, 
then the violation period would range from the actual date of 
termination until the end of the sixty-day notice period."  Id. 
at 1286-87.   
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 We agree with the reasoning of the Dillard court.  It 
is the date when the employment loss could be expected to occur 
that marks the starting point, not the date on which the employee 
learns that a loss will occur in the future.  Ordinarily, the 
starting point will be the end of the seasonal layoff, but here, 
Preferred set the date by stating in its letter that the work 
loss would commence on August 1st.2  Preferred's notice period 
began on July 10, 1992 and the 60 calendar days needed to avert a 
violation would extend to September 8, 1992.  Because the 
indefinite layoff began on August 1, the employees therefore 
would be entitled to damages for thirty-nine calendar days 
(August 1 to September 8).  If, however, any employee reasonably 
expected his or her seasonal recall to end before August 1, 
additional damages would be due so as to account for the full 60 
days period.  For example, a worker whose seasonal layoff would 
have ended on July 29 would be entitled to forty-one days.  
 This method of calculation is consistent with the 
purpose Congress had in mind when it enacted the WARN Act. The 
regulations capture the spirit of the legislation in stating that 
the 60 day notice "provides workers and their families some 
transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, 
to seek and obtain alternative jobs" or to obtain training for 
further employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1. 
                                                           
2Because of the timing of Preferred's notice, employees may 
receive what might, in other circumstances, be regarded to some 
extent as a "windfall" by obtaining wages for days they otherwise 
would have been on seasonal layoff.  As we noted earlier, 
however, Preferred selected the date as August 1 and employee 
benefits were phased out as of that date.   
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 By using the formula adopted here, employees who were 
not actually working when the layoff extension was imposed 
receive the same amount of time to seek employment and make the 
necessary adjustments as workers who were on the job at the time 
the indefinite layoff was imposed.  In the only published opinion 
in which an analogous situation was presented, a district court 
came to a similar conclusion.  See Marques v. Telles Ranch, Inc., 
867 F. Supp. 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1994).   
 Accordingly, the order of the district court holding 
Preferred liable under the WARN Act will be affirmed.  The case 
will be remanded to the district court for recalculation of the 







      
 
